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TORTS-PRODUCTS LIABILrrY-SuccEsSOR

CORPORATION STRICTLY LIABLE

FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED BY THE
PREDECESSOR CORPORATION.

Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc. (N.J. 1981)
Efrain Ramirez was injured while operating a sixty ton punch
press,' and subsequently brought suit against Amsted Industries, Inc.
(Amsted),2 a successor corporation to the original manufacturer of the
press, Johnson Machine & Press Company.5 In 1962, Amsted acquired
by a purchase agreement all the assets of the intermediate successor,
Bontrager, for cash. 4 In the purchase agreement, Amsted expressly refused to assume liability for any claims arising out of defects in products
manufactured by Amsted's predecessors. 5 On that basis, the defendant
moved for and was granted summary judgment.6
1. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 335, 431 A.2d 811, 812-13
(1981). The Johnson Model 5 sixty ton punch press was manufactured by
Johnson Machine and Press Company of Elkhart, Indiana, in 1948 or 1949. Id.
at 335, 431 A.2d at 812-13. The injury occurred on the premises of Ramirez's
employer, Zamax Manufacturing Co., in Belleville, New Jersey, on August 18,
1975. Id. at 335, 431 A.2d at 812.
2. Id. at 335-36, 431 A.2d at 813. In the trial court, Ramirez sought to
recover damages from Amsted on theories of negligence, breach of warranty,
and strict liability in tort for defective design and manufacturing. Id. Plaintiff's complaint also named as defendants various distributors of the Johnson
power press; however, all claims against these parties were either settled or
dismissed. Id. at 336 n.1, 431 A.2d at 813 n.l.
3. Id. at 337-38, 431 A.2d at 814. In 1956, Johnson Machine and Press
Company transferred all of its assets and liabilities to Bontrager Construction
Company. Id. at 337, 431 A.2d at 814. Bontrager retained a single share of
Johnson common stock in order to continue the Johnson name and corporate
form. Id. at 338, 431 A.2d at 814. By a purchase agreement dated August
29, 1962, Amsted acquired all of the assets of Bontrager, including the one
share of Johnson stock and the manufacturing plant in Elkhart, Indiana, for
$1,200,406 in cash. Id.
The Johnson corporation was dissolved in July 1965 pursuant to the Indiana General Corporation Act. Id. at 339, 431 A.2d at 815, citing, IND. CODE
ANN. §23-1-1-1 (Burns 1971). From the time of the 1962 purchase from Bontrager until the dissolution of the Johnson corporate shell in 1965, Amsted's
officers served as the officers and directors of Johnson. 86 N.J. at 339, 431
A.2d at 815.
4. 86 N.J. at 338, 431 A.2d at 814. For a discussion of the details of the
purchase, see note 3 supra.
5. 86 N.J. at 338-39, 431 A.2d at 814. The purchase agreement contained
an express limitation on the assumption of liability which read: "It is understood and agreed that Purchaser shall not assume or be liable for any liability
or obligations other than those herein expressly assumed by Purchaser; all
other liabilities and obligations of Seller shall be paid, performed and discharged by Seller." Id. at 338, 431 A.2d at 814. Further, the agreement stated:
"Seller alone shall be responsible, to the extent of the warranties heretofore

(411)
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On appeal to the Superior Court of New Jersey, the decision of the
trial court was reversed.7 After granting Amsted's petition for certification, s the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed,9 holding that a successor corporation which acquires all, or substantially all of the assets
of its predecessor for cash, and which continues essentially the same
manufacturing operations, is strictly liable for the defective products
of its predecessors. Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431
A.2d 811 (1981).
The transfer of corporate ownership may be accomplished in one
of three ways: I) merger or consolidation with another corporation;
2) sale of stock to another corporation; or 3) sale of its assets to another
corporation.' 0 In the first type of transaction, the liability of the
given by Seller to its customers, for all liability for the correction and repair
of defects in material or workmanship thereof." Id. at 339, 431 A.2d at 814.
6. Id. at 336, 431 A.2d at 813. The trial court held that, "there is no assumption of liability when the successor purchases the predecessor's assets for
cash and when the provisions of the purchase agreement between the selling
and purchasing corporations indicate an intention to limit the purchaser's
assumption of liability." Id.
7. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 261, 408 A.2d 818
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), af'd, 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981). The Appellate Division of the Superior Court refused to allow Amsted to limit any products liability claims through the use of an exculpatory clause. 171 N.J. Super.
at 276, 408 A.2d at 826. The court stated, "we find this attempt at anticipatory exculpation wholly anachronistic in the context of the development of
our product liability law." Id. at 276, 408 A.2d at 826. The court made
an analogy to the automobile manufacturers' disclaimers to limit liability for
damages caused by defective products. Id., citing, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
8. 82 N.J. 298, 412 A.2d 804 (1980). For the pertinent rules regarding
certification to the Supreme Court of New Jersey to review a final judgment of
the Appellate Division, see N.J. CT. R. 2:12-3 (1969). The rule granting certification states: "Certification will be granted only if the appeal presents a
question of general public importance which has not been but should be
settled by the Supreme Court." N.J. CT. R. 2:12-4 (1969).
9. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
In a companion case decided the same day as Ramirez, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that both an intermediate and successor corporation would
be liable for product liability claims of their predecessor. Nieves v. BrunoSherman Corp., 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981). For a discussion of Nieves,
see note 102 and accompanying text infra.
10. Note, Postdissolution Product Claims and the Emerging Rule of Successor Liability, 64 VA. L. REV. 861, 864 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Postdissolution Products Claims]. See also Note, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 92 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Assumption of Products Liability]; Note, Expanding the Products
Liability of Successor Corporations, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1305, 1308 (1976). See
generally Hoffman, Products Liability for Successor Corporations: A Break
from Tradition, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 357 (1978); Kadens, Practitioner's Guide
to Treatment of Seller's Products Liability in Assets Acquisitions, 10 U. TOL.
L. REV. 1 (1978).
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former corporation will be assumed by the new entity." Where there
is a sale of a corporation's assets, however, the traditional rule has been
2
The
that a purchaser for value does not assume the seller's liabilities.'
the
of
popularity
the
for
reason
avoidance of liability is the primary
3
sale of assets as a method of corporate transfer.'
However, the successor must assume the debts and liabilities of the
predecessor corporation in situations where: 14 1) the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such debts and liabil11. See Note, Postdissolution Product Claims, supra note 10, at 864 n.15.
State statutes generally provide for the automatic assumption of all liabilities,
known or contingent, by the acquiring corporation when there is a merger.
H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 280 (rev. ed. 1946). See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CORP. Acr § 76(e) (2d ed. .1971). A purchasing corporation buying stock
in the selling entity assumes the risk of the seller's liabilities to the extent of
its interest in the seller. See Schiff, Products Liability and Successor Corporations: Protecting the Product User and the Small Manufacturer Through Increased Availability of Products Liability Insurance, 13 U.C.D.L. REv. 1000,
1004-05 (1980); Note, Assumption of Products Liability, supra note 10, at 93.
12. See McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 561, 264 A.2d
98, 101 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288
A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972), overruled, Wilson v. Fare Well Corp.,
140 N.J. Super. 476, 493, 356 A.2d 458, 468 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). See
also Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128, 131 (D.N.J. 1976);
N.J. Transp. Dep't v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 454, 419 A.2d
1151, 1154 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980); Jackson v. N.J. Manufacturers Ins. Co.,
166 N.J. Super. 448, 454, 400 A.2d 81, 84 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), cert.
denied, 81 N.J. 330, 407 A.2d 1204 (1979); Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140
N.J. Super. 476, 484, 356 A.2d 458, 463 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). See generally Note, Assumption of Products Liability, supra note 10, at 93 where it
was noted, "the general rule of non-assumption of liability is interrelated with
the rights of creditors to payment in satisfaction of their claims out of corporate assets." Id. "Creditors can be paid out of the consideration received
from the buyer as long as it is adequate." Id. If the seller makes distributions to its shareholders either improperly or pursuant to a dissolution, the
creditors, in order to satisfy their claims, can pursue the distributions into the
hands of the stockholders. Id. at 93-94. Creditors can also seek satisfaction
of their claims from a purchaser of the debtor's assets, but only if the purchaser paid inadequate consideration or had knowledge of the seller's probable
default on its debts. Id. at 94.
13. See Note, Postdissolution Product Claims, supra note 10, at 865. The
attractiveness of this feature of a sale of assets has led parties to various kinds
of corporate transactions employing complex and sophisticated methods to
legally disguise the exact nature of the transfer. Id. See also, Wallach,
Products Liability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant-The Effect of a Sale
of Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on Products Dissatisfaction Claims, 41
Mo. L. REv. 321, 336 (1976). Avoidance of liability is not the only reason
for the popularity of the sale of assets. This form of transfer escapes the
other statutory requirements of merger, and allows the parties to devise their
own contract without the necessity of according appraisal rights to dissenting
stockholders. Id. at 336 n.5. Also, fewer stockholders are needed to approve
the change. Id.
14. See notes 15-20 and accompanying text infra.
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ities; 15. 2) the transaction amounts to a "de facto" consolidation or
merger of the seller and purchaser; 16 3) the purchasing corporation is
a "mere continuation" of the selling corporation,17 or 4) the transaction
is entered into fraudulently in order to escape responsibility for such
debts and liabilities.18 In McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co.,19 the New
15. See Bouton v. Litton Indus., Inc., 424 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1970) (purchase agreement expressly assuming numerous liabilities arising in the ordinary
course of business, also included the risk of products liability claims). See
also Freeman v. White Way Sign and Maintenance Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 884,
403 N.E.2d 495 (1980) (purchase agreement negated any assumption of responsibility by the successor while the predecessor corporation continued to operate
as a separate entity and was available for suit). But see Kloberdanz v. Joy
Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (purchase agreement assumed liabilities for accounts payable, payroll taxes and wages, but the court found no
implied assumption of products liabilities since the transfer of tort liabilities was not expressly included in the contract).
16. See Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975). For a discussion of Knapp, see notes 23 & 24
and accompanying text infra. See also Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J.
Super. 476, 356 A.2d 458 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). The Wilson court lists
the characteristics to be considered in determining whether a "de facto" merger
has taken place. Id. at 485, 356 A.2d at 464. These characteristics include a
transfer or sale of all assets, an exchange of stocks, a change of ownership
whereby the stockholders, officers, and creditors go to the surviving corporadon, and the assumption of a variety of liabilities pursuant to previously
negotiated agreements. Id. One court has summarized a set of characteristics
which would constitute a "de facto" merger as follows:
(I) There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation
so that there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general business operations.
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders which results from the purchasing corporation paying for the acquired assets with shares of its
own stock, this stock ultimately coming to be held by the shareholders of the seller corporation so that they become a constituent
part of the purchasing corporation.
(3) The seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations,
liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible.
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal business operations of the seller corporation.
Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974),
citing, McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 563-65, 264 A.2d 98,
103-05 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970), af 'd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288
A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972), overruled, Wilson v. Fare Well Corp.,
140 N.J. Super. 476, 493, 356 A.2d 458, 468 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). The
Shannon court found that the organization and operation of the original corporation were continued substantially unchanged after the takeover. Shannon
v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. at 801. See also Applestein v. United
Board and Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 349-50, 159 A.2d 146, 155 (Super.
Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960).
17. See, e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (Ist Cir. 1975); Turner
v Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 27-33 and accompanying text infra.
18. See Note, Postdissolution Product Claims, supra note 10, at 866 n.24.
Plaintiffs in products liability cases who have relied on this exception gen-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss2/5

4

Kessler: Torts - Products Liability - Successor Corporation Strictly Liabl

1981-82]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

415.

Jersey Superior Court referred to a fifth exception which sometimes is
incorporated as an element of one of the above exceptions, namely the
20
absence of adequate consideration for the sale or transfer.
I In an effort to make the traditional corporate transfer rules viable
in .a strict products liability world, courts have modified and expanded
the "de facto merger" and "mere continuation" exceptions. 21 The de
facto merger doctrine was expanded by the Third Circuit in Knapp v.
North American Rockwell Corp.22 In Knapp, the court looked beyond
the form of the transaction, 23 and assessed the abilities of the plaintiff
and the successor corporation to bear the loss, and found the successor
24
corporation liable.
Courts have not established a uniform test to determine "mere continuation," 2 but generally if the purchaser is in essence a "reincarnaerally have been unsuccessful. Id. See also Pierce v. Riverside Mortgage Sec.
Co., 25 Cal. App. 2d 248, 257-58, 77 P.2d 226, 230-31 (1938).
19. 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970), a0f'd per
curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972), overruled, Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super. 476, 493, 356 A.2d 458, 468
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
20. 109 N.J. Super. at 561, 264 A.2d at 102.
21. For a discussion of various approaches to successor liability, see notes
22-33 and accompanying text infra. See also, Fegan, Successor Corporations
and Strict Liability in Tort-A Convergence of Two Opposing Doctrines, 69
ILL. B.J. 142 (1980); Hoffman, supra note 10; Schiff, supra note *11; Note,
Assumption of Products Liability, supra note 10; Note, Postdissolution Product
Claims, supra note 10.
22. 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
23. 506 F.2d at 363. On the date of injury, two corporations (North
American Rockwell and Textile Machine Works (TMW)) existed because
the selling corporation (TMW) had not yet dissolved. Id. Because one corporation existed in form only, the court ignored the continuation of the
vendor corporation after the closing date of the transaction, and found the
vendee corporation liable for the defective product of the seller corporation.
Id. at 368-69.
24. Id. at 369-70. The Third Circuit determined that Rockwell Was better
able to stand the burden of the loss. Id. Rockwell, therefore, should not have
been permitted to impose the weight of the loss upon a user of an allegedly
defective product by delaying the dissolution of TMW. Id. See also Note,
Corporations-ProductsLiability Under the De Facto Merger Doctrine-Knapp
v. North American Rockwell Corp., 49 TEMP. L.Q. 1014, 1019-20 (1976).
25. Compare Ozan Lumber Co. v. Davis Sewing Mach. Co., 284 F. 161,
165 (D. Del. 1922) (key element is the continuation of the "legal entity")
with Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D. Colo. 1968) (key
factors are continuity of ownership and management and the prompt dissolution of the seller). See also Jackson v. Diamond T. Trucking Co., 100 N.J.
Super. 186, 241 A.2d 471 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968). The Jackson court
posited five elements of mere continuation: 1) a transfer of corporate assets,
2) for less than adequate consideration, 3) to another corporation that continued the business operation of the seller, 4) when both corporations had at
least one common director or officer who was instrumental in the transfer, and
5) when the transfer rendered the seller incapable of paying its creditors' claims
because it was dissolved either in fact or in law. Id. at 196, 241 A.2d at 477.
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tion" of the seller, the purchaser will be held responsible for the seller's
obligations.20 In Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.,2 7 the First Circuit expanded
the mere continuation approach to include situations where the successor corporation appeared to the public to be the same enterprise as
the predecessor. 28 Relying on the continuity of the entire "business"
enterprise, the Cyr court determined that liability should be imposed on
the successor corporation.2 9
In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.,80 the Michigan Supreme
Court developed a special test which was the next step in the "mere
continuation" doctrine's development. 8 ' For a successor corporation to
be liable in a products liability claim, the court held, the totality of the
26. Note, Assumption of Products Liability, supra note 10, at 100. Courts
have been reluctant to expand this exception to facilitate the claims of plaintiffs. Id. at 100-01. See, e.g., Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp.
128, 139 (D.N.J. 1976) (summary judgment granted when factors needed to
prove continuation were absent); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp.
817, 821 (D. Colo. 1968) (in holding for defendant, court found no "mere
continuation").
27. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
28. Id. at 1151. In the purchase agreement the buyer promised to conduct the business as the predecessor had, and assumed a number of liabilities
including the obligation to service the presses already marketed. Id. The
buyer assumed a name almost identical to that of the predecessor, represented
itself through advertising as a forty-year old business, and manufactured the
product in essentially the same manner as had its predecessor. Id.
In its analysis, the Cyr court discussed the overt representations of continuity by the successor:
The dictates of freedom of business decision are less compelling when
an ongoing business assumes all other benefits and liabilities of its
predecessor, holds itself out to the world as the same enterprise,
without notifying known customers, continues to function in the same
manner... with the same key employees, producing the same product.
Id. at 1153. The court further stated:
The manufacturer's successor, carrying over the experience and expertise of the manufacturer, is likewise in a better position than the
consumer to gauge the risks and the costs of meeting them. The successor knows the product, is as able to calculate the risk of defects as
the predecessor, is in a position to insure therefor and reflect such cost
in sale negotiations, and is the only entity capable of improving the
quality of the product.
Id. at 1154.
29. Id. The Cyr court stated:
[A] corporation itself cannot act. It can conduct its business only
through its officers and employees. The negligence of employees in
carrying out that business is the responsibility of the corporate body.
If as a group the same employees continue, without pause to produce
the same products in the same plant, with the same supervision, the
ownership of the entity which maintains essentially the same name
cannot be the sole controlling determinant of liability.

Id.
30. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
31. Id. at 426, 244 N.W.2d at 882.
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transaction must demonstrate a basic continuity in the enterprise.32
The Turner court reasoned that there was no distinction between a
merger or sale of stock, and a sale of assets for the purpose of a products
liability claim.3 3
By developing a strict liability approach toward successor corporations, the decision of the California Supreme Court in Ray v. Alad
Corp.,34 represents a significant departure from traditional corporate
Although the plaintiff's claim in Ray did
rules of successor liability.
32. The Turner court stated:
Where the successor corporation represents itself either affirmatively
or, by omitting to do otherwise, as in effect a continuation of the
original manufacturing enterprise, a strong indication of continuity
is established. Justice would be offended if a corporation which holds
itself out as a particular company for the purpose of sales, would not
be estopped from denying that it is that company for the purpose of
determining products liability.

Id.
The court relied upon the retention of key personnel, assets, general business operations, and the predecessor's name in finding a basic continuity of
enterprise. Id. at 430, 244 N.W.2d at 884. See also Korzetz v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (the Turner approach applied to the same line of corporate succession as was present in the Ramirez
case; finding of strong and convincing evidence of continuity of enterprise
lead to holding that Amsted was a mere continuation of its predecessor, Johnson); Trimper v. Bruno-Sherman Corp., 436 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Mich. 1977)
(although Turner had included the requirement that the seller dissolve its
business operation after transfer, the seller's failure to do so did not avoid
the totality of the transaction constituting a basic continuity of the die-cutting
press enterprise). For a discussion of Trimper, see Note, Postdissolution
Product Claims, supra note 10, at 874.
33. 397 Mich. at 423, 244 N.W.2d at 880. The court recognized that there
"is no basis for treating a purchase of corporate assets different from a de
facto merger" and urged that "[i]t would make better sense if the law had a
common result and allowed products liability recovery in each case." Id. The
court noted: "While a difference in degree can be established between the
continuity arising from a stock transfer as opposed to a cash payment for
assets, it is just that, a difference in degree." Id. at 429, 244 N.W.2d at 883.
The court saw the needs and objectives of the injured party and the corporation as the same whether there was a merger, de facto merger, or sale of assets,
as long as the transferor corporation was dissolved. Id. The court also noted
that "once corporations considering such transactions become aware of the
possibility of successor products liability, they can make suitable preparations."
Id. at 428, 244 N.W.2d at 883.
34. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
35. Id. at 30, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579 . The California Supreme
Court in Ray felt that a special departure from the general rule was warranted in light of the significance accorded the policies underlying strict tort
liability for the manufacture of defective products. Id. The Ray court determined that the public policy objectives accomplished by imposing strict
roducts liability on successor corporations were more important than those
asic goals of corporate law which were the basis of the traditional rule. Id.
at 30-31, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579. The traditional rule had been
structured within a corporate framework to promote the availability and
transferability of capital. Id. See Note, Postdissolution Product Claims, supra
note 10, at 877. The significance of the rule in Ray is that, instead of relying
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not come within one of tihe four exceptions to the traditional corporate
rule for determining successor liability,86 the court fashioned the
"product line" approach, and held the successor corporation strictly
liable in tort for injuries caused by the defective products of its predecessor.8 7 Under this approach, if the product line remains intact, a8 the
successor is charged with liability for injuries caused by the products
sold by a predecessor even in the absence of continuity of ownership
between predecessor and successor.8 9
in whole or in part on the corporate framework, the court actually discarded
that framework and shaped an exception based on tort law, which was responsive directly to the goals of products liability. Id. See Note, Ray v. Alad:
Imposing Liability on the Successor Corporation for the Defective Products
of the Predecessor Corporation, 15 CAL W.L. RPv. 338 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Ray v. Alad.]

36. See notes 12-20 and accompanying text supra.
37. 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582. Upon acquiring Alad I's plant, equipment, inventory, trade name, and good will, Alad II
continued to manufacture the same line of ladders under the "Alad" name,
using the same equipment, designs, and personnel and soliciting Alad I's customers through the same sales representatives with no indication of any change
in the ownership of the business. Id. at 25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at
576. The Ray court ruled that a party that acquires a business and continues
to manufacture the same line of products under circumstances present in Ray
assumes liability for the predecessor's products. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136
Cal. Rptr. at 582. See also Note, Ray v. Alad, supra note 35, at 340. If the
product line remains intact, then successor liability will result even if there is a
total absence of continuity of ownership between predecessor and successor.
Id.
38. Note, Ray v. Alad, supra note 35, at 340. But see Dawejko v. Jorgen- , 434 A.2d 106 (1981).
The Pennsylvania
Superior Court adopted the "product line" approach as another exception to
the traditional rule. Id. at - , 434 A.2d at 110. The court stated, "to]he
may retain the traditional exceptions but expand their boundaries, so that
merger or continuation are held to include cases they once would not
have included. Or one may adopt a new exception such as the product-line
exception." Id. at - , 434 A.2d at 111. The court did not find strict liability
for defective products in every instance where the "product line" remains
intact, but instead stated that, "it should be phrased in general terms, so that
in any particular case the court may consider whether it is just to impose
liability on the successor corporation." Id. at -, 434 A.2d at 111 (emphasis
added). The court identified various factors which will be pertinent: "whether
the successor corporation advertised itself as an ongoing enterprise; or whether
it maintained the same product, name, personnel, property, and clients; or
whether it acquired the predecessor corporation's name and good will and
required the predecessor to dissolve." Id. at - , 434 A.2d at 11.

sen Steel Co., - Pa. Super. Ct.

39. See Note, Ray v. Alad, supra note 35, at 340. The rationale for imposing strict liability upon a successor corporation is based upon three public
I licy considerations. Ray v. Alad, 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 8-9, 136 Cal.
tr. at 580. The California Supreme Court in Ray said:
justification for imposing strict liability upon a successor to a manufacturer under the circumstances here presented rests upon (1) the
virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the original manufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of the business, (2)
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In Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc.4 0 and Travis v. Harris Corp.4 1 the
Seventh Circuit refused to extend the type of strict tort liability established in Ray v. Alad Corp. to successor corporations, and has retained
the traditional rule.2 In Leannais, the purchase agreement expressly
limited the successor's liability for personal injuries caused by a predecessor's products for a period of five years from the closing of the
contract, and provided for the use of best efforts by the successor to
secure a specific amount of insurance against such claims during that
time. 43 Since the claim did not arise during that period, the Seventh
Circuit would not obligate the successor to insure against liabilities due
to the predecessor's products."
In dicta, however, the Seventh Circuit
the successor's ability to assume the original manufacturer's riskspreading rule, and (3) the fairness of requiring the successor to
assume a responsibility for defective products that was a burden
necessarily attached to the original manufacturer's good will being
enjoyed by the successor in the continued operation of the business.
Id. For a further discussion of the policy rationales, see Note, Ray v. Alad,
supra note 35, at 346-48; Hoffman, supra note 10, at 368, 371-73. Cf. Rawlings
v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1979) (the
court, in applying the same rationale of Ray, extended liability where the
injury occurred 'three months before the successor acquired the business and
where it was alleged that the successor had discontinued or at least modified
the product line in question).
40: 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977).
41. 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977).
42. Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d at 439; Travis v. Harris Corp.,
565 F.2d at 446. For a discussion of the traditional rule, see notes 12-20 and
accompanying text supra.
43. 565 F.2d at 438. The machine on which Leannais was injured had
been manufactured by Forte Equipment Company and sold to Fullerton in
late 1964. Id. Forte sold its assets to Cincinnati, Inc., for cash and certain
employment contracts. Id. Cincinnati, Inc., was first notified of Leannais'
injury more than seven years after the acquisition of Forte's assets. Id. at 439.
44. Id. at 441. The Leannais court, finding the exceptions to the nonliability of asset purchasers too great an imposition on the public, refused to
apply Ray to preserve a plaintiff's postdissolution claim. Id. Applying Wisconsin law, the Seventh Circuit based its refusal on the absence of any decision adopting such an approach to successor liability. Id. It also commented on the merits of the Ray approach, cautioning that the competing
considerations best could be resolved not in the context of a particular case
but by legislative action. Id. See generally Note, Limitation of Action:
Strict Liability in Tort-The Legislature has Intervened, 67 ILL. B.J. 214 (1968);
Note, When the Product Ticks: Products Liability and the Statute of Limitations, 11 IND. L. REV. 693 (1978) [hereinafter cited as When the Product Ticks];
Note, Statutes of Repose in Products Liability: The Assault Upon the Citadel
of Strict Liability, 23 S. DAX. L. REV. 149 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Statutes
of Repose]; Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D. Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225
N.W.2d 454 (1975).
The Leannais court criticized the "adoption of policy consideration to
effect a change in a law so fundamental to the interdependent economic segments of a complex society." 565 F.2d at 440 n.7. The dissent noted that
Wisconsin had not considered a postdissolution products liability claim since
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did establish a duty to warn. 48
Against this background, the Ramirez court 48 began its discussion
with a survey of the pertinent case law.47 Although the New Jersey
Supreme Court had not previously ruled on successor liability 48 the
court acknowledged that the traditional rule and its exceptions had
heretofore been accepted by the lower courts of New Jersey.4 9 The
Ramirez court concluded, however, that the rule of successor corporation
non-liability "is indeed inconsistent with the developing principles of
strict products liability and unresponsive to the interests of persons
adopting the theory of strict liability in tort. Id. at 443 (Fairchild, C.J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
45. 565 F.2d at 442. The Leannais court determined that the existence
of a duty on the part of the successor to warn the past and present purchasers
of the defective product, would be determined by factual questions that
would be answered on remand. Id. Whether the defendants succession to
service contracts would be a sufficient nexus to establish a legal duty to warn
could not at that time be determined. Id. Factors to be considered would be
whether the machine involved was under a service contract, whether defendant
had serviced that machine, and whether defendant had knowledge of its
predecessor's prior service records. Id.
In Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977) the boundaries
of the duty to warn were given further clarification. The court held that the
mere purchase of name and good will were not enough to create a duty. to
warn. Id. at 448. It added another factor to those considered in Leannaisknowledge of the defect. Id. at 449. The Travis court stated: "Absent knowledge of defects, nothing is known to warn against. Absent knowledge of the
location of a machine, there is no known entity to warn." Id. See also Gee
v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1980) (the court would not impose
a duty to warn because the record was devoid of evidence of factors which
courts have used in determining the existence of such a duty); Wilson v. Fare
Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super. 476, 356 A.2d 458 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
The trial court briefly mentioned, in dicta, the state of the law in the area of
a duty to warn on the part of successor corporations. Id. at 491-93, 356 A.2d
at 467-68.
46. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825. Justice Clifford wrote for the majority of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, joined
by Justices Sullivan, Pashman, Handler, Schreiber, and Pollock. Justice Schreiber concurred in the result. Chief Justice Wilentz did not participate in the
decision.
47. Id. at 340-50, 431 A.2d 815-20. The court acknowledged the existence
of several approaches to the issue of successor liability in products liability
cases, and reviewed the holdings of McKee, Turner, Cyr, Korzetz, and Ray.
Id. For a discussion of McKee, see text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra.
For a discussion of Turner, see notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra. For
a discussion of Cyr, see notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Korzetz, see note 32 supra. For a discussion of Ray, see notes 34-39
and accompanying text supra.
48. 86 N.J. at 340, 431 A.2d at 815.
49. Id. See, e.g., Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128
(D.N.J. 1976); N.J. Transp. Dep't v. PSC Resources Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980). For a discussion of the traditional rule and its exceptions, see notes 12-20 and accompanying text supra.
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injured by defective products in the stream of commerce." S0 The court
reasoned that the form of corporate transfer should not determine, as
it does under the traditional rule, whether the plaintiff can recover.51
In response to these considerations, the court decided to consider al52
ternative approaches.
The court first considered, but refused to adopt an expanded "mere
continuation" exception as articulated by the Michigan Supreme Court
in Turner.55 The court saw Turner and its progeny as rendering inconsistent results,5 because those decisions focused on commonality of
ownership and management, instead of on the continuation of the
actual manufacturing operation.5 5
The court instead adopted the "product line" approach of Ray
which imposes strict tort liability for defective products on successor
corporations which acquire a manufacturing business and continue the
predecessor's manufacturing operation.56 The court reasoned that the
50. 86 N.J. at 342, 431 A.2d at 816. The court refused, therefore, to
decide the case on the basis of the traditional rule established in New Jersey
by McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1972), overruled, Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J, Super. 476, 493,
356 A.2d 458, 468 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
51. 86 N.J. at 343, 431 A.2d at 816. In support of this proposition, the
Ramirez court quoted the Supreme Court of Michigan's decision in Turner:
To the injured persons the problem of recovery is substantially the
same, no matter what corporate process led to transfer of the first
corporation and/or its assets. Whether the corporate transaction
was (1) a traditional merger accompanied by exchange of stock of
two corporations, or (2) a de facto merger brought by the purchase of
one corporation's assets by part of the stock of the second, or (3) a
purchase of corporate assets for cash, the injured person has the same
problem, so long as the first corporation in each case legally and/or
practically becomes defunct.
Id., quoting, 397 Mich. at 419, 244 N.W.2d at 878.
52. 86 N.J. at 343, 431 A.2d at 816-17.
53. Id. at 347, 431 A.2d at 818-19. For a further discussion of Turner
and the expanded "mere continuation" exception, see notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra. See also Hoffman, supra note 10, at 366-68.
Despite the potential for liability under the "mere continuation" exception,
the court emphasized that the Appellate Division had actually based its decision not on the Turner analysis, but rather on the "product line" theory
developed in the Ray case. 86 N.J. at 347, 431 A.2d at 819.
54. 86 N.J. at 347-48, 431 A.2d at 819.
55. Id.
56. Id. The court noted fundamental, practical and analytical differences
between Turner's expanded "mere continuation" exception and Ray's "product
line approach." Id. The court said, "Turner merely broadens the inroads into
the traditional principles of corporate successor non-liability expressed in McKee
and related cases." Id. Ray, by contrast, in abandoning the traditional rule

altogether, utilizes the policies which underlie strict products liability. Id. As
a result, the court adopted the Ray approach. Id. at 348, 431 A.2d at 819,
citing, Ray v. Alad, 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 27: p. 411

cost of injuries from defective products should be borne by the manufacturer who benefits from continuing the business enterprise and is
7
able to spread the cost to society at large.5
Finally, the Ramirez court responded to various contentions raised
by Amsted against imposing strict liability on successor corporations.58
To Amsted's assertion that it was not responsible for actually placing the
defective machine in the stream of commerce, 50 the court responded that
"strict liability for injuries caused by defective products placed into the
stream of commerce is an 'enterprise liability', one that continues so
long as the defective product is present on the market." 60 The court
posited that the successor has the means available for avoiding the risk
of harm caused by its predecessor's defective products, and is in a better
position than the consumer to bear the costs of accident avoidance. 61
In response to a claim that imposition of strict liability would have a
crippling effect on the ability of small manufacturers to transfer ownership of business assets, 62 the court said that these business concerns

57. 86 N.J. at 349, 431 A.2d at 820. The court stated that the "plaintiff's

potential remedy against Johnson, the original manufacturer .

. . ,

was de-

stroyed by the purchase of Johnson's assets, trade name, and good will, and
Johnson's resulting dissolution." Id. at 350, 431 A.2d at 820. The court,
noting the progressive character of New Jersey decisional law in the products
liability area, saw the imposition of successor liability as consistent with, the
public policy in strict products liability of spreading the cost of injuries from
defective products to society at large. Id. The court stated "[t]he imposition

upon Amsted of responsibility to answer claims of liability for injuries allegedly
caused by defective Johnson presses is justified as a burden necessarily attached
to its enjoyment of Johnson's trade name, good will and established manufacturing enterprise." Id. at 352, 431 A.2d at 822. The court believed that
public policy required that the successor corporation which acquires the
benefits of continuing the business enterprise should also be made to bear the
burden of operating costs that they would ordinarily bear. Id. at 352-53, 431
A.2d at 822.
58. Id. at 351-58, 431 A.2d at 822-24.
59. Id. at 335, 431 A.2d at 812-13. The machine involved was manufactured by Johnson Machine and Press Company in 1948 or 1949, thirteen years
prior to Amsted's acquisition of Johnson's assets. Id. at 335, 431 A.2d at 812-13.
60. Id. at 351, 431 A.2d at 821, quoting, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 65, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965).
61. 86 N.J. at 352, 431 A.2d at 821. The court noted that Amsted had
acquired the Johnson trade name, physical plant, manufacturing equipment,
inventory, records of manufacturing designs, patents and customer lists, and
also continued employment of factory personnel. Id. at 352, 431 A.2d at 822.
With these facilities and sources of information, the court concluded that
Amsted had virtually the same capacity as Johnson to estimate the risks of
claims for injuries. Id.
62. Id. at 353, 431 A.2d at 822. Amsted contended that "[b]usiness planners for prospective purchasing corporations will be hesitant to acquire a
potential can of worms that will open with untold contingent products liability claims." Id.
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3
should not overshadow the basic social policy of risk spreading."
Additionally, the court noted that the issue of the time period during which a party may bring suit for an injury arising out of a defective
product is properly one for legislative rather than judicial determination.64 The majority also rejected Amsted's argument that the new
standard of liability should have solely prospective application, and
should not be applied in the instant case.05
Justice Schreiber filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed with
the approach adopted by the majority,66 but disagreed with its retroactive application. 67 Justice Schreiber based his opinion on the fact
that Amsted had not placed the defective product in the stream of
commerce, and had relied in good faith on the law as it then existed in
not planning for the possibility of future liability resulting from a
predecessor's defective product.6 8

63. Id. at 354, 431 A.2d at 823. The court mentioned that corporate
planning has protective devices available to insulate it from the full costs of
accidents arising out of defects in the predecessor's products. Id. These indude adjustments to the purchase price, obtaining products liability insurance,
and indemnification or escrow agreements. Id. The court concluded that
social policy favors imposition of the costs of injuries from defective products
on the manufacturing enterprise and consuming public, rather than on the
innocent injured party. Id.
64. Id. at 355, 431 A.2d at 823. Defendant asserted it was unfair to impose
liability for a product manufactured twenty-eight years, and two corporate
owners earlier. Id. The court drew an analogy to the New Jersey statute
of limitations for injuries arising out of defective and unsafe conditions of
improvements to real property which provides for a limitation of ten years
from the date of the performance or furnishing of the construction services.
Id. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:14-1.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). For articles on
statutes of repose, see note 44 supra.
65. 86 N.J. at 356-57, 431 A.2d at 824. While the court agreed that there
was a reasonable basis for reliance by successor corporations on the general
rule of nonliability under the McKee approach, it believed that the plaintiffs
in this case "should not be denied the reward for their efforts and expense
in challenging the traditional corporate law principles .... " Id. The court
stated, "there is a basic justness in recognizing that persons who have exercised
the initiative to challenge the existing law should be accorded relief if their
claims-not yet resolved when the new rule of law is announced-are ultimately
vindicated." Id. The court chose November 15, 1979, the date of the Appellate Division decision, as the date from which the new rule would be applied.
Id.

66. Id. at 358-60, 431 A.2d at 825-26. (Schreiber, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 359, 431 A.2d at 825 (Schreiber, J., concurring). Justice
Schreiber stated, "[i]t is inequitable to saddle, as the majority does, all previous
purchasers of assets, who have not assumed the liabilities arising out of defects
of previously manufactured products, with those liabilities when the accident
occurs after November 15, 1979." Id. Focus should be placed on the date
of acquisition by the successor corporation, rather than on the date of the
accident. Id. at 361, 431 A.2d at 826 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 359-60, 431 A.2d at 825 (Schreiber, J., concurring). Justice
Schreiber further noted that injured persons have not been left totally "un-
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In analyzing the Ramirez decision, it is difficult to justify the court's
adoption of strict tort liability for successor corporations. The majority
relied heavily on the successor's ability to estimate the risks of claims
for injuries from defects in previously manufactured products, 69 and to
pass on the costs of those risks to the purchasers.7 0 Despite the arguments of the court, it is submitted that the purchaser cannot be fully.
aware, at the time of the sale, of the hidden risks associated with a
product line.7 ' From the purchaser's perspective, this produces a harsh
result because at the time "[w]hen its purchase contract was made, [the
successor] had no responsibility for the product, and it in no way contributed to the accident." 72 Moreover, while a large public corporation
recompensed", citing workers' compensation, and accident and health insurance. Id. at 361, 431 A.2d at 826 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 352, 431 A.2d at 822. The majority reasoned that "because the
manufacturer transfers to its successor corporation the resources that had previously been available to [the manufacturer] for meeting its responsibilities
to persons injured by defects in [products] it had produced, the successor
rather than the user of the product is in the better position to bear accidentavoidance costs." Id. at 352, 431 A.2d at 821, quoting, Ray v. Alad, 19 Cal. 3d
at 33, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581 (insertions by the court). The
court concluded that "[w]ith these facilities and sources of information,
[Amsted] had virtually the same capacity as [Johnson] to estimate the risks
of claims for injuries from defects in previously manufactured [presses]."
86 N.J. at 352, 431 A.2d at 822, quoting, Ray v. Alad, 19 Cal. at 33, 560 P.2d
at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581 (insertions by the court).
70. 86 N.J. at 350, 431 A.2d at 820. The court stated:
The imposition of successor corporation liability upon Amsted is consistent with the public policy of spreading the risk to society at large
for the costs of injuries from defective products. . . . Suffice it to
say that this court has long recognized the significance of the social
policy of risk-spreading in establishing the manufacturer's duty to the
product user under the rapidly expanding principles of strict liability
in tort.

Id. Justice Schreiber comments that "it is unfair to impose the economic
monetary consequences on the purchaser. Not only has the purchaser paid
more than it would have, it has also been deprived of any opportunity for
contractually providing for indemnification from the seller or for some other
protective device, such as an escrow." Id. at 360, 431 A.2d at 826 (Schreiber,
J., concurring).
71. See Note, Ray v. Alad, supra note 35, at 356. The author of the note
feels that the general rule of nonliability "promotes transfer of corporate
property' and "allows the parties to freely negotiate and correctly determine
the value of the transferred property." Id. However, the author indicates
that in using strict liability for successor corporations, "[t]he parties are forced
to bargain with variables that can not be reasonably reflected in the sale
price." Id. The author further asserts that "the importance of these intangible variables dealing with the future liabilities of the product line depends largely upon the time of the plaintiff's injury and whether the corporate
statutes permit a dissolved predecessor corporation to be sued;" two elements
usually not considered or known at the time of acquisition by the successor
corporation. Id. at 357.
72. 86 N.J. at 359, 431 A.2d at 825 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
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may be in the position to absorb and pass on the costs involved,8 many
corporate transfers involve closely held corporations which are not able
to afford the prohibitive costs of products liability insurance and one
claim may be sufficient to send the successor into dissolution.7 4
Somewhat more unsettling is the court's cursory treatment of the
planning involved in the acquisition of another corporation's assets
while providing for successor liability. 75 The court maintained that
adjusting the purchase price, obtaining products liability insurance, and
establishing escrow or indemnity agreements would be sufficient to meet
the risk of potential liabilities.7 6 It is submitted, however, that the
73. Note, Ray v. Alad, supra note 35, at 347.

74. Id. The author of the Note argues persuasively that close corporations simply do not have the capital to afford the skyrocketing costs of liability
insurance. Id. The author points out that the average products liability
award to an injured plaintiff is nearly $100,000 and that the significance of
this dollar amount can be put into proper perspective by comparing it to the
value of total assets in Ray ($200,000 total assets after acquisition, of which
over one-half was in the form of an outstanding promissory note, owing to
the stockholders of the predecessor corporation). Id. at 359 n.127. The author
asserts that one products liability claim in this situation is potentially enough
to bankrupt a small corporation like Alad. Id. See also Kadens, supra note
10, at 23, where it was stated that there has been a "crisis" in the purchase
of products liability insurance for corporations, similar to the medical malpractice insurance crisis of 1975-1976, due to premium costs of products
liability insurance rising geometrically. Id. See 86 N.J. at 360, 431 A.2d at
826, where Justice Schreiber, concurring, admits that "it is questionable whether
purchasers may realistically be able to acquire insurance policies covering them
for future accidents caused by defective products made and sold prior to
acquisition." Id. at 360, 431 A.2d at 826 (Schreiber, J., concurring). Justice
Schreiber noted that only 21.6% of those businesses seeking products liability
insurance can obtain it. Id., citing, Products Liability Insurance: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Capital, Investment, and Business of the House
Committee on Small Business, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Part 1) (1977). See also
Hoffman, supra note 10, at 878; Schiff, supra note 11, at 1023; INTERAGENCY
TASK

FORCE,

PRODUCTS

LIABILITY:

FINAL

REPORT OF THE INSURANCE

STUDY

2-21 (1977) (Insurance rates for manufacturers increased 340%, from 1974 to
1976).
75. 86 N.J. at 354, 431 A.2d at 822-23. The court states: "[a] corporation
planning the acquisition of another corporation's manufacturing assets has
certain protective devices available to insulate it from the full costs of accidents
arising out of defects in its predecessor's products." Id. For a discussion of
these "protective devices" see note 76 and accompanying text infra.
76. 86 N.J. at 354, 481 A.2d at 822-23. The court acknowledged, and
quickly dispensed with all of the questions traditionally raised in opposition
to the use of these "protective devices" which protect the successor corporation
from some of the liability claims of its predecessor:
True, the parties may experience difficulties in calculating a purchase
price that fairly reflects the measure of risk of potential liabilities for
the predecessor's defective products present in the market at the time
of the asset acquisition. Likewise, do we acknowledge that small
manufacturing corporations may not find readily available adequate
and affordable insurance coverage for liability arising out of injuries
caused by the predecessor's defective products. However, these concerns, genuine as they may be, cannot be permitted to overshadow
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court is forcing the parties to bargain with variables that cannot reasonably be reflected in the sales price. 77 Further, it is suggested that the
use of an escrow agreement would not be satisfactory to either the purchaser or the seller, as neither party would be able to receive the full
benefits of the sale.78 Also contrary to the suggestion of the majority, 79
the use of an indemnity agreement requiring the seller to reimburse the
purchaser for money judgments has not been accepted.8 0
It is also contended that the court's reliance on insurance as a
remedy for a successor corporation's potential liability is not supported
by the realities of the insurance industry.8' Over the last decade,
the basic social policy, now so well-entrenched in our jurisprudence,
that favors imposition of the costs of injuries from defective products
on the manufacturing enterprise and consuming public rather than
.on the innocent injured party.
Id. at 354, 431 A.2d at 823.
77. See notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra.
78. See Schiff, supra note 11, at 1022-23. This commentator explains that:
[U]nder an indemnity agreement, or as an alternative to indemnity,
the purchaser might require that a portion of the purchase price be
delivered to a third party stakeholder. The funds would remain in
escrow for a stipulated period of time during which the funds could
be used to pay judgments rendered against the successor in cases based
on the predecessor's faulty products. When the stipulated period
lapsed, the remaining funds would go automatically to the seller who
could then distribute them among the shareholders of the dissolved
corporation.
Id. The author supports the use of escrow agreements because the purchaser
can be sure that he is not liable beyond the amount in the account after the
stipulated period of time. Id. Schiff additionally argues that since the account is controlled by a neutral party, the injured party is more certain of
collection. Id. For an argument against the use of escrow agreements, see
Note, Ray v. Alad, supra note 35, at 355-56.
79. 86 N.J. at 354, 431 A.2d at 823.
80. See Schiff, supra note 11, at 1022. If the seller refuses to insert an
open indemnification clause, the purchaser might suggest indemnification
with a fixed ceiling. Id. Schiff believes that while a fixed ceiling provision
does not protect the purchaser against all possible judgments, it will help
insulate the company in the first years of production while it establishes new
manufacturing procedures and becomes financially stable. Id. See Rawlings
v. D. M. Oliver, 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 900-01, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119, 124 (1979) in
which the court admitted that the predecessor was subject to an indemnity
cause of action brought by the successor. Id. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the circumstances of the predecessor's continued existence did
not guarantee an adequate remedy for the plaintiff and, therefore, justified
granting to the plaintiff a cause of action against the successor. Id. It
noted that the predecessor was a sole proprietorship whose owner died prior
to the filing of the plaintiff's suit. Id. At this time, the owner's date of
death, the period in which the claims were to have been filed, the size, nature,
and distribution of his estate were all unknown, creating barriers to the plaintiff's recovery. Id.
81. See Hoffman, supra note 10, at 375. As recently as 1975, no state had
developed a comprehensive legislative insurance scheme for the products lia-
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products liability coverage has been on a selective basis, while "costs
have risen geometrically." 82 Further, when insurance has been available
to the seller, the coverage has been applied only to claims filed after
the acquisition date that occurred prior thereto.83
Given the questionable protection available for corporations who
acquire another corporation's assets, 8 4 it is submitted that these concerns
overshadow the basic social policy of imposing the costs of injuries from
defective products on the industry which manufactures them and the
consuming public. Furthermore, as suggested by Justice Schreiber s5
there are other adequate remedies to protect injured persons from being
totally uncompensated. s8
bility of successor corporations. Id. By 1977, at least 39 states had some
form of insurance legislation under consideration. Id. Hoffman also discusses the insufficiency of prepaid insurance in this area. Id. See also Kadens,
supra note 10, at 23, where the author stated, "whereas ten years ago most
businesses carried products liability insurance if there was any real risk of liability, such universality is no longer true," and claimed that the prohibitive
costs of insurance premiums have caused a "crisis" in the availability of product
liability insurance for successor corporations. Id.
82. Kadens, supra note 10, at 23 & n.70, citing, SrLEcr COMMIT'rEE ON
SMALL BUSINESS, 28Tn ANN. REPT., ch. 18, IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY ON
SMALL BUSINESS, 167-71, S. REP. No. 629, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); U.S.
DEPT.

OF

COMMERCE,

CONSUMER

PRODUCT

TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY,

SAFETY

COMMISSION,

INTERAGENCY

FINAL REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,

PB-

273-200, at xxxv-xxxvii (1977) (culmination of a study ordered in April, 1976,

by the Economic Policy Board of the 'White House in response to increasing
concern about rising products liability claims and costly insurance.)
83. See Kadens, supra note 10, at 36. Kadens stated that the "buyer must
determine whether the 'policy period' (if it has an occurrence policy) or the
'retroactive date' (if it has a claim-made policy) will cover injuries sustained
prior to the acquisition date, but not acted upon until after the acquisition."
Id. This commentator suggests that the buyer may seek to obtain an assignment of seller's rights in seller's policies, or may attempt to have itself named
an "additional insured" under seller's continuing policies. Id. This latter
alternative has two benefits: any loss will not be charged against the buyer
by its own insurer as an experienced loss, and conflicts among buyer's and
seller's insurers as to primary or joint liability will be avoided. Id.
84. See notes 69-83 and accompanying text supra.
85. See 86 N.J. at 361, 431 A.2d at 826 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
86. Id. Justice Schreiber suggests that "[w]orkers' compensation, accident
and health insurance policies, and the liability of the manufacturer's of the
defective product insurer are some monetary sources which may be available
to compensate the injured plaintiff." Id. See also When the Product Ticks,
supra note 44, at 722, quoting, INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY
CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY (1977) which said "about one-half of the total of product

liability payments for personal injury goes to employees injured on the. job
and, therefore, presumably already covered by workers' compensation." Id.
This commentator said that since workers' compensation returns about 70%

of the insurance dollar to the injured party, beginning as early as one week
after the accident is reported, workers' compensation should be the sole remedy
to employees for workplace accidents. Id. It is notable that injuries suffered
by an employee at his worksite due to a defective product manufactured by a
dissolved corporation is only covered by workmen's compensation benefits. Id.
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The impact of imposing strict liability on successor corporations
will be most heavily felt by the small corporations 87 which are more
vulnerable than their larger counterparts to potential liability for injuries caused by a predecessor's product. 88 Strict liability will decrease
the marketability of those small corporations,89 perhaps forcing sellers
into liquidation proceedings. 90 A purchase of assets for cash may no
longer be desirable, 9 ' and could arguably discourage business planners
from acquiring corporate assets in New Jersey and encourage them to
go to a state without such a burdensome strict liability policy. 92
Another important question left unresolved by the Ramirez decision is the potential for open-ended liability. This issue stems from
the court's imposition of strict liability on successor corporations for
defects in a predecessor's product manufactured nearly twenty-eight years
before the injury occurred. 93 A statute of limitation will not alleviate
87. Schiff, supra note 11, at 1003. Schiff points out that, currently, small
manufacturing corporations comprise 90% of the nation's manufacturing enterprises. Id. Schiff refers to the Department of Commerce definition of small
business, i.e., "any manufacturing plant that employs 100 persons or fewer, a
wholesale establishment with annual sales less than $200,000, or other business with sales or receipts less than $400,000 a year." Id. at 1002 n.10. For a
discussion regarding small corporation's inability to pay sky-rocketing costs
of products liability insurance, see note 73 supra. Schiff also stated that "Imlost
small corporations are unable to secure policies covering liability for injuries
caused by the predecessor's products." Schiff, supra note 11, at 1005. She
suggested that the legislature modify the insurance laws to accommodate the

small successor corporation, and argued that until this is done, a small manu-

facturer must, in an effort to protect his investment, plan carefully to avoid a
transfer of liabilities. Id. at 1004.
88. Schiff, supra note 11, at 1002. Schiff reasoned that small corporations
have limited assets, and thus face possible financial destruction should the
predecessor's products give rise to multiple personal injury suits. Id. Personal injury suits frequently give rise to hundreds of thousands of dollars in
damages. Id. at 1002 n.11.
89. Id. at 1002-03. Schiff argued that "[t]he economy as a whole suffers
when small successor corporations lose such cases since corporate acquisitions
are discouraged due to business planners' fears of being held so liable." Id.
These fears diminish the marketability of these small corporations. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1003 n.12. Selling the assets of an on-going corporation is
preferable to a sale of the assets in a liquidation proceeding. Id. A sale of
assets by a successful on-going business tends to guarantee the successor a
degree of security in establishing the business, and to keep waste at a minimum.
Id. A sale of liquidated assets, by contrast, deprives the new owner of the
assets of benefiting from the business relations and procedures previously
established by the seller. Id. The stability established by the seller is lost,
and the successor must start from the beginning with increased risks of business failure. Id. In addition, a sale of assets in a liquidation proceeding is
often burdensome for the shareholders since buyers must be found for each
asset, and sales are made in a piecemeal manner. Id.
92. Id. at 1003.

93. 86 N.J. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
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the successor's open-ended liability, as it would not begin to run until
the time the injury occurs.9 4 The successor corporation's expectancy
of liability will not be capable of determination at the time that the
transfer is made.5 Statutes of repose which begin to run when the
product is introduced into the stream of commerce have been challenged
successfully in some courts on the ground that they violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, since some plaintiffs may be
barred before their claims even arise.96 It is suggested that, as a practical
matter, it would be extremely difficult to determine the length of time
which should be set in a statute of this nature. 97
The application of the "product line" approach to successor corporations in Ramirez9 8 leaves open the question of whether a successor's
94. See Note, 'Ray v. Alad, supra note 35, at 357. The author discussed
the problem in relation to California's statute of limitation. Id. The New
Jersey statute of limitation only provides that, "[e]very action at law for an

injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any
person within this state shall be commenced within 2 years next after the
cause of any such action shall have accrued." N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:14-2 (West
1952). See also Statutes of Repose, supra note 44, at 171. The author maintains that the fact that the statute will not begin to run until the injury accrues
"is contrary to the very, purpose of the statute designed to relieve the court of
the burden of trying 'ancient' claims about 'ancient' products." Id.
95. See Note, Ray
extent of liability of a
and therefore cannot
corporate acquisition."

v. Alad, supra note 35, at 357-58, which states, "[t]he
successor corporation does not end at a definite time,
be accounted for in the negotiations surrounding a
Id.

96. See When the Product Ticks, supra note 44, at 717. See also Kallas
Millwork Corp. v. Square D. Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975) (the
Wisconsin Supreme Court found such a statute of repose to be barred by a
provision in its state constitution which guaranteed a legal remedy for all
injuries). But see 86 N.J. at 355-56, 431 A.2d at 823-24. The New Jersey
court makes an analogy to a state law which provides a ten year statute of
repose for injuries that arise out of a defective or unsafe condition of an
improvement, to real property which has been upheld by the New Jersey courts.
Id. at 355, 431 A.2d at 823. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:14-1.1 (West Cum. Supp. 19811982). See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
97. See When the Product Ticks, supra note 44, at 718. The commentator
noted that "capping liability five years from date of first sale would obviously
affect far more products, industries and claims than would a ten year repose
provision." Id. Consideration has also been given to a "useful life" statute
of limitations. Statutes of Repose, supra note 44, at 177. The determination
of useful life would require expert testimony provided by the very manufacturer who placed the product in the market. Id. Discounting the manufacturer's bias in determining the useful life, it is difficult to imagine a time
period constructive for all or many products, thus presenting a potential series
of repose statutes each presenting its own series of problems. Id. at 178.
98. See Schiff, supra note 11, at 1015. But see Dawejko v. Jorgensen
Steel Co., - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 434 A.2d 106 (1981). This court identified
various factors "so that in any particular case the court may consider whether
it is just to impose liability on the successor corporation." Id. at -, 434 A.2d
111 (emphasis added). The court has done so as "not to phrase the new
exception too tightly." Id. at -, 434 A.2d at 111.
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9
change in design of the defective product line of the predecessor, 9 or
°°
would exculpate it from
its issuance of a manufacturer's warning,'
leaves unanswered the
also
approach
line"
"product
The
liability.
question of whether the continued existence of the predecessor, often in
name only, after the corporate transfer, forecloses successor liability for
the predecessor's defective products. 1 1 And finally, the strict liability
rationale can be extended to hold those intermediate corporations in a
corporate chain of succession liable, together with the successor, for the
claims from their predecessor's defective products.10 2 By focusing its

99. See Rawlings v. D. M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr.
119 (1979). The California appeals court found liability to attach under
the Ray rationale to a successor corporation, even though the successor discontinued the product design responsible for the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 901,
159 Cal. Rptr. at 124. Another commentator saw this inducement to change
defective product design as a policy reason for adopting strict liability for
successor corporation: "[T]he potential for imposition of liability may make
the successor alert to defects in the predecessor's product line and encourage
him to introduce safety devices and warnings to diminish risks associated with
the product's use." Note, Postdissolution Product Claims, supra note 10, at

863 n.12.
100. See Statutes of Repose, supra note 44, at 178. The commentator
suggested that requiring a manufacturer to place a warning on the product
indicating a period of useful life, or cautioning that there may be defective

parts might reduce a successor's liability for injury claims from the product.
Id. It is argued that if such warning were effective ". .. the user would be
put on notice that use of the product after the specified time would be at his
own peril." Id. In this respect, continued use would be comparable to assumption of the risk or, preferably, could be used in apportioning fault under
comparative negligence standards. Id. The commentator, however, discourages the use of manufacturer's warnings for this purpose, arguing that, like
disclaimers, these warnings require the manufacturer to put the user on fair
notice and must be agreed to by the user. Id.
101. See Kadens, supra note 10, at 21. Kadens reads Ray and Turner to
say that "if a seller elects not to dissolve until several years after closing, a
non-assuming assets buyer would not be liable for any of the seller's postacquisition products liabilities." Id. See also Note, Ray v. Alad, supra note
35, at 350. This author notes that in Knapp, despite contractual requirements,
the predecessor failed to dissolve until eighteen months after the agreement.
Id., citing, Knapp v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d at 363. Since the
predecessor was in effect a "mere shell," the court ignored its continued existence and found the successor corporation liable for the defective product of
the predecessor. Id. at 351. See also Rawlings v. D. M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal.
App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1979). The court stated that "the injury
occurred three months before defendant purchased the business. Rawlings'
rights, however, cannot turn on the closing date over the sale of a business
over which he had no control. The timeliness of her action is governed solely
by the applicable statute of limitations .... ." Id. at 900, 159 Cal. Rptr. at
123. The court concluded that "successor liability on the basis of strict products liability may be imposed." Id. at 902, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 125. The court
leaves the question of the predecessor's liability open by stating, "[w]hether
plaintiff has a satisfactory remedy against Mrs. Stubbendieck [the predecessor]
remains a triable issue of material fact." Id. at 900, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 124
(insertion added).
102. See Nieves v. Bruno-Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981).
The New Jersey Supreme Court held Harris-Intertype Corporation, the inter-
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attention only on the protection of the plaintiff, the court has failed to
recognize the potential economic implications of imposing such liability
on the corporations of the State of New Jersey. The cumulative effect
of the inherent problems that befall successor corporations should dissuade other jurisdictions from adopting the product line approach, and
opening the Pandora's Box of complications that California and now
New Jersey have ignored.
Joseph F. Kessler
mediate corporation between the predecessor, Old Sheridan, and its successor,
Bruno-Sherman, jointly liable for the product liability claims of Nieves resulting from a defective die-cutting power press manufactured by Old Sheridan.
Id. at 369, 431 A.2d at 831. The court stated that:
The imposition on Bruno-Sherman of potential liability for injuries
caused by defects in the Sheridan product line is justified as a fair
and equitable burden necessarily attached to the substantial benefit
that it enjoyed in the "deliberate albeit legitimate exploitation of
[Old Sheridan's] established reputation as a going concern manufacturing a specific product line .... " Imposition of potential liability
on Bruno-Sherman is further justified by its ability to gauge the risks
of injury from defects in the Sheridan product line and to bear the
accident-avoidance costs.
Id. at 368, 431 A.2d at 830, quoting, Ray v. Alad, 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d
at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
In Nieves, Harris contended that there was no justification for imposing
liability on the intermediate corporation because "there is missing an essential
functional prerequisite to the imposition of that liability, namely, the nonavailability of a viable manufacturer of the product line against which plaintiff may seek recompense." 86 N.J. at 370, 431 A.2d at 831. Harris also
contended that Ramirez should be limited to the current, viable manufacturer
of the product line at the time of plaintiff's injury and suit. Id. Harris noted
that the Ray court focused on one corporate successor to the product linethe one viable, extant corporation that had succeeded to the manufacturing
operation of the original manufacturer. Id. The Nieves court, however, ad:1
dressed these contentions by stating:
The reason the Ray court focused upon only one corporate successor
to the Alad product line is because there was only one viable, extant
successor corporation-Alad 11. The fact that there are two such
successors to Old Sheridan in the present case does not alter the reality
that Harris' acquisition of the business assets and manufacturing operation of Old Sheridan contributed to the destruction of the plaintiff's
remedies against the original manufacturer. By acquiring the business assets of Old Sheridan and continuing the established. operation
of manufacturing and selling Sheridan die-cutting products, Harris
"became 'an integral part of the overall producing and marketing
enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products.'" Harris' prominent role in the overall enterprise of,
manufacturing Sheridan's die-cutting presses is not to be overlooked
merely because the plaintiff's injury did not occur while Harris was
actually engaged in the manufacturing operation.
Id. at 371, 431 A.2d at 831 (citations omitted). The Nieves court remanded
the case to the trial court to make the factual determination of whether Harris
had a duty to warn. The Supreme Court of New Jersey implied that it did.
Id. at 373, 431 A.2d at 822-23.
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